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BOOK REVIEWS.

The Development of English Thought; a Study in the Economic Interpretation of History. By SIMON N. PATTEN, PH.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1899. 8vo, pp. xxvii + 415.

THE appearance of such a work as that of Dr. Patten is natural under existing conditions. Through the mediation of economic science the writing of history is tending to become more psychological and psychology to widen its scope until it includes the thoughts, feelings and wills of the individual writ large in the history of mankind. Students of psychology have been very quick to make application of the principles of imitation and suggestion to explain the action of a mob or the atmosphere of a literary period; students of history have much more slowly come to realize that history can be interpreted only in terms of the development of human consciousness.

Economists have long claimed that the economic motive is the psychological explanation of the events of history and it is to be expected that a deeper analysis of the motive would come from scholars in this field.

It is, of course, a commonplace to say that the recent development of science has so divided up the field of human knowledge that a reaction in the direction of unification is inevitable. The simultaneous growth of the new sciences, psychology and sociology, is an evidence of this. When the study of the individual mind was pursued, it was soon found that only a social individual could be studied. This led to the study of society. When a basis and a method for the study of society was sought, it became evident that only with the exercise of the power of thought has society been formed and developed, and this led in turn to the study of psychology. Society, therefore, must be studied in one of its products—thought; and thought must be studied, if at all, in the process of making. The belief that the thought of any one period is a unity, determined by certain conditions, is by no means new in philosophy. This unity has been spoken of in the more or less mystical form of the *Zeitgeist*, and more attempt has been made to demonstrate the fact of the existence of this *Zeitgeist* than to explain what it really is. Hegel's *Philosophy of History* attempted both the

demonstration and the explanation, Professor George E. Morris's *British Thought and Thinkers* is a demonstration, Professor Patten's book another attempted explanation.

In the writing of world-history a desire to find some correlating principles in the endless chain of causes and effects has been called the philosophy of history. The progress of the idea of history from a mere chronicle of events to the conception of a philosophy of history and thence to the scientific view set forth by Thorold Rogers and Cunningham is a most interesting study in apperception, but the student of history of this day and time rejects the so-called philosophies of history as more stimulating than true, and the economic interpretation as too narrow to include all of human life and thought. Both standpoints he now sees to be tenable only in so far as they will bear the test of psychology. Professor Patten is of this opinion and so starts with a statement of the fundamental principles of psychology as he understands them—sensation and movement, habit and imitation. With these few and simple principles in mind he will rewrite the story of the English mind, from the migrations of the German tribes to the nineteenth century.

Before examining the contents of the volume, let us ask ourselves what will probably be the method of attacking so large a subject. Will it be to rewrite the whole of the history, showing how each event was brought about by economic and these by psychological causes? Or, will it be by a careful dividing up of the field and setting certain limits to the endeavor? British thought naturally manifests itself in many forms, literature, science, philosophy, religion, art, education, economics, etc. An economist might perhaps be expected to limit himself to British economic thought. If he is not a great scholar in other lines he may be expected to make an intensive study of the development of thought in his own line, and to offer a satisfactory psychological explanation of it. Certainly one would not expect a scientist to take some religious and some moral thought and the best of the economic, no belles-lettres or æsthetics and then call it English thought.

A natural subdivision of the subject would be into constructive, critical, and reactionary periods, for a psychological treatment must explain both normal and pathological facts. A psychological explanation of historical events is much simpler than a psychological explanation of thought, for events are but the acts of individuals or masses,

and these often — in fact almost always — from impulse, suggestion, or imitation and not from the higher and more complex processes of conception, judgment and reasoning. He who will explain how thoughts have arisen out of the soil of sensation and movement has set himself a difficult task, involving much more psychology than the few principles which Professor Patten lays down in his first five pages. The historical student, then, would naturally look for some careful study of a given period of English history in which the effect of economic environment upon temperament, thought and activity should be traced, the connecting principles proven by such psychological investigations as can be cited.

Let us see, now, how the subject is treated. The theory is set forth in the first chapter. The elements of history are said to be — man, environment, and sensory and motor reaction to environment. The formation of habits of reaction is the cause of national and race characteristics. This is again stated on p. 267: "Roughly speaking, there are three elements in a civilization: the heart, which represents inherited impulses that usually express themselves in a religious form; the life, which is due to immediate economic surroundings; and the head or intellect, which reflects the influence of past conditions upon the present."

Environments are then classed as local and general, and the statement is made that a local environment gives rise to a pain economy, and a general environment to a pleasure economy. Changes in the environment give rise to new epochs. The thesis of the book is stated most clearly on p. 213: "New philosophies develop out of new economic conditions and not out of old theories." Subjectively, changes are explained by a more or less conscious imitation, and by a kind of recrystallizing of old habits, generally known as conversion — connecting an old motor mechanism with a new group of sensory ideas." This is the psychological basis of character. The differences in character are brought about by differences in reaction to environment, *i. e.*, differences in food-getting, in the necessities of climate and physiography, etc. The classification of society is really according to degrees and kinds of activity, but names are used which have already acquired a significance which gives them more vitality and suggestiveness than would be expressed by calling the clingers the passive or receptive type; the sensualists — those who stood for personal power or mastery — the physically active type; and the stalwarts, such as puri-

tans, Presbyterians, or Quakers, the morally active or reforming type; and the mugwumps—such as university men—the intellectual type. Of these four classes the stalwarts are to be the dominant element of the future. At present they lack leaders, but are moved by definite programs, such as “territorial expansion, world-supremacy of the race, a forceful application of racial concepts in industry and political rights to inferior races, strong antipathies to all who fall below or differ from accepted social standards, the subjugation of husbands, total abstinence, fixed standards of wages and comfort, the diffusion of wealth and the socializing of education” (p. 293). At present skilled workmen are the dominant type of stalwarts. What direction their energies are to take is yet to be determined.

In the intellectual type the highly developed senses cause so many reactions that they inhibit each other and little or no activity results. Little activity is absolutely necessary for survival, and the energy aroused is dissipated within the organism itself. They have no class characteristics.

The other part of the theory shows the stages through which thought passes—the economic, aesthetic, moral, and religious. The two former treat of goods, the two latter, of environments. The curve of thought begins with facts and rises to theories, thence backward and downward to facts. The problem is first stated, then reasoned upon inductively, from facts, then deductively from logic and theory. It has been the peculiar province of Englishmen to arouse Germans from dogmatic slumbers. “If we view English thought from this standpoint, there are three clearly defined epochs. In the first, Hobbes states the problem of the age without solving it; Locke is the economist on the upward curve; Newton is the thinker on the downward curve. In the second, Mandeville states the problem, Hume is changed from an economist into a philosopher, and Adam Smith from a philosopher into an economist. The third epoch, beginning with Malthus, ends when Mill is transformed into a philosopher, and Darwin into a biologist” (p. 55).

Following this theory of the curve of thought in its higher stages comes the exposition of the history of English thought, from which the theory was probably derived.

English thought is based upon the characteristics of German, Roman, and Semitic civilization, receiving its social unity from the Germans, its citizenship and law from the Roman tribute-taking state,

and its religious ideas from the Semitic humility before the forces of nature.

"The instincts of primitive races are due to conditions found in cold, wet countries, or hot, dry countries, or countries in which one race dominates another." The effect of the climate upon Germanic races, the development of social bonds, the supremacy of the church through the industrial power of the monasteries, and its influence upon society and the state, are sketched down to the Reformation, which is described as an issue between crime as defined by the church and vice as understood by ancient German social ideas—social and moral motor reactions. "There was not the slightest connection between Protestantism and the invention of gunpowder and the discovery of America. . . . Discovery brought the evils of the century, morality its benefits. . . . The Reformation was a premature movement forced on Europe by temporary causes before society was ready for the change." "The Reformation could not have happened at a more unfortunate time."

The standpoint which is given by such statements as these about the Reformation is one of the best things such a book can give. Many persons are doubtless made to realize with a little shock that they have hitherto held almost a teleological position with regard to the Reformation.

After this period has been considered economically, we reach finally the treatment of English thought, which is divided into Calvinistic, moralistic, and economic theory. In this division of the subject, more than in anything else Dr. Patten says, it is evident that he means to write only *Beiträge*, and not a systematic economic interpretation of English thought. His aim is surely to treat as much of English thought as he is ready to state in terms of economic development, and thus does not include English literature or English aesthetic development.

Protestantism, it is said, does not exist but two separate "isms," which it was impossible to unite. Calvinism (which has previously been given as an example of stalwartism) was and is congenial to those in whom the clannish spirit is strong, who look upon themselves as favored sons; it is the earliest form of a sociocracy, and has a strong feeling of the solidarity of responsibility. "The Calvinist believes he has more than he deserves, and because he is so favored he must put upon himself certain restraints that would not otherwise be demanded. . . . His first thought is of the duties these privileges impose, and in

this he differs from the German, whose first thought is of the morality of his acts." "Luther expected to be taught by nature, and to conform to nature except where divine revelation had given a higher law" (p. 111). Calvinism brought an entirely new habit of mind—a new concept of man—as something apart from his occupation or his possessions. In this respect it was like the change made by primitive Christianity, and this was the democratic concept—sociocracy of character. In psychological terms, with the spread of Calvinism men became self-conscious members of society, and they also grew in reasoning powers by acquiring the ability to form concepts. Another step in mental growth was taken when the English Bible trained the imagination. By making men visualize heaven and hell and the judgment, they soon learned to form ideals of life and of law and order in the state. As soon as economic conditions made family life agreeable—by the introduction of chimneys and glass windows into houses and improvements in diet—puritanism sprang up, and the conflict between puritan and sensualist formed the English character as we know it today. The puritan conquered the sensualist, and then himself died because of his economic shortcomings. Individual classes of stalwarts have not survived because their asceticism has decreased their numbers. When this struggle had formed the English character a new type of men appeared, of which Thomas Hobbes is the first thinker worthy of study. Before studying Hobbes, Professor Patten sets forth his theory of the discovery of new truth, and then illustrates it by showing how Hobbes' Commonwealth was determined by current education and by his favorite pursuit, mathematics. "There is not one fresh study of human nature in all his volumes nor one analysis of which he could justly be proud. It must be admitted that he had the right attitude. . . . The worst of it is that Hobbes's careless work has been the curse of psychic studies ever since" (p. 154).

The one respect in which Locke is in advance of his time is in the doctrine of association of ideas, and this, according to Professor Patten, makes his social theories worthless, because "historical facts, customs, and ceremonies yielded to this method and became a mass of isolated data which could be tested by their correspondence with sense impressions." Locke's thought is treated especially with regard to its influence upon the concept of personality. "The self is now reduced to a mere point, connected with the outside world by a series of sense-perceptions" (p. 184).

After the period of Hobbes and Locke, men's minds began to act in parts. Religious and civil ideas then acquired distinct associations, with separate motor responses. Thus a new type sprang up — the discriminating mugwump. "The first cause of the rise of this class was the prevalence of consumption. . . . In a nation where no one class was strong enough to dominate, compromise was the principle of action" (p. 186). "Since the time of Locke there has been practically no development of political thought" (p. 188).

The moral direction of thought which followed the cessation of progress in political thought came from the changes in agriculture, family life and the new social conditions. The intellectual step here was the introduction of the attitude of observation. The disposition to collect data with regard to country life and to judge of the world by that evidence was first expressed in Mandeville's "Fable of the Bees," the main thought of which is that spending makes trade lively, while frugality causes industrial stagnation. Mandeville's point of view was that self-interest prompts men to actions which harmonize with the public welfare, and that cheap food was the basis of national prosperity. In his work are found nearly all the doctrines that made up the body of the new science.

Hume's design "was to write a book on what we now call social psychology" (p. 215). In Hume's writing custom and habit were affirmed as universal laws, while the sensualism of Mandeville was combined with the skepticism of Hume's favorite classical authors. Adam Smith took the principles of human nature out of their moral setting and made them do service in the realm of economics. The one economic doctrine which he had clearly in mind when he published his lectures was the connection between cheapness and plenty. Adam Smith was naturally a moralist and became an economist by accident — not by design. He explained problems by human nature and not by environment. "The Wealth of Nations" became a new type of natural theology and gained a hearing because it satisfied the same feelings that natural theology did. The old optimism was based on the thought that wickedness is always punished. . . . The new economic optimism was based on the thought that the righteous are always rewarded (p. 242). "The improvement in economic and religious thought paved the way for the religious awakening associated with Wesley and the rise of Methodism."

Calvinism was killed by the doctrine of predestination. The new

conditions at the beginning of the new century favored the growth of Methodism, Whitefield representing the religious effect of the new power visualization, while Wesley represented observation. Calvinism had taken root among women who were the dominant influence during the industrial awakening. "Every advance in education and family religion increased the importance of women" (p. 254). Methodism, however, checked the growing supremacy of women. When they were restricted in the religious sphere they began to pay attention to economic affairs, and so the modern social movement is largely due to women. There was no Wesleyan philosophy, but Methodism demanded outward signs of an inward change, as well as "an experience." Its demonstrativeness was due to the fact that it "utilized a fund of activity for which the outlets were denied either by economic activities, moral scruples or inherited prejudice" (p. 258). Puritanism had suppressed the motor reactions of the previous economic stage. Wesley's emphasis on psychic phenomena raised up new religious ideas and weakened the feeling of responsibility, thus displacing objective standards. The ideas of Wesley and Smith completely controlled England during the next period. Morals might be defined as the application of the philosophic deductions of one age to the economic conditions of later ages. "There can be no morality without an ideal of society by which the feeling of the solidarity of responsibility is aroused" (p. 273). Methodism viewed from the psychological standpoint changed the concepts of God and Christ and so marked the end of creed-making and sect-building.

The chapter treating of the English economists begins with a statement of the economic decline of France and the causes of the French Revolution. These, says Dr. Patten, are very simple, being reducible to scarcity of wheat. This cause became all-powerful in this way: economic conditions were not so bad in France as they had previously been, in fact not so bad as in other European countries, and there was a general belief that there was plenty and comfort for all. Adam Smith's wage-fund theory was the economic formulation of this belief. Now "wheat had long been a leading crop in England and had been accepted as a measure of wages and of welfare." When, therefore, wheat must be imported, England and France must compete for the supply and France failing to get it, the conclusion was drawn that the form of government was in some way responsible and revolution followed. "Every social problem in some way took its rise in the condition of the wheat market." The well-trained student will at once say

that this ascription of all events to one cause is very uncritical and comes near to the narrowness of the economic motive—nearer than anything else in the book.

Professor Patten's treatment of the place of the Mills in the history of economic thought is very keen and discriminating. J. S. Mill's whole attempt, says he, was to put social studies on a scientific basis; this was the final cause of his logic. Few physical sciences existed, and he knew little about them, but Comte showed him the difference between inductive and deductive reasoning, and Ricardo's theory of rent contained the suggestion for a philosophy of inductive reasoning. The result of this work was greatest in theology; it did not help the social sciences a particle. He did create a new conception of what the sciences are, and thus gave the death-blow to dogmatism. The whole of Professor Patten's criticism of the economists is an example of the insight of the literary man who simply sees and need not be compelled to prove, as is the writer of an ordinary plodding scientific treatise.

The concluding chapter deals with the environment, both economic and intellectual, of the present age, and makes some predictions as to the future. The effect of religious, philosophical, educational, and economic ideals are discussed, with probable adjustments. There, as in all the other chapters, are many statements to be challenged; many things to be regarded not only as unproved, but as unprovable—but the assertions made concerning socialism are especially unsatisfactory to those persons who are acquainted with what socialism is at the present time. Dr. Patten seems to base his criticism of socialistic ideals upon socialism as it was about the middle of this century. It certainly is true that socialism is most desired by those who most need it, and this is about all the argument that it is a "device to reduce activity and to allow more time for the enjoyment of sensory pleasures" amounts to. Rest and sensory enjoyment are no more regarded by socialists as the highest possible good than by the rest of the thinking world. The argument that "the great essentials of environment alone inspire activity" has no longer the deadening force that it once had. The optimistic remarks concerning the socialization of religion and the victory of the principles of stalwartism over sensualism and mere passivity are so in line with the hopes of this generation that the book has certainly an agreeable farewell.

Since to make a complete psychological interpretation of English thought would require more knowledge of psychology than anyone

as yet has; a most intimate knowledge not only of the events of history, but of the growth of literature, art, industry, and religion, plus the quality of mind necessary to see all these things in their relations and interrelations, it would be remarkable if Professor Patten's reach did not much exceed his grasp. His book is one most welcome, and all thoughtful students of history will be thankful that he has published his *Beiträge* as they are and not left them in the form of notes in his desk waiting until he should be endued with omniscience.

Historical writing has been for some time in the stages which Spencer calls the "instability of the homogeneous" and the "multiplication of effects;" with this book the stage which may be called "segregation" is reached. Crystallization has appeared in spots, but the source of English history is by no means yet written as an organic unity. "Suggestions for a psychologic interpretation of English history," or "an economic interpretation of some phases of English thought," would express more clearly what is contained within the covers of this book. It should be viewed as a frank expression of the *status quo* of Professor Patten's mind, and as a starting point for other writers upon the same subject; and all criticisms of it should be taken as other groping attempts to co-operate in constructing the desired interpretation of history. Most critics will probably attempt to show how far it falls short of a complete and comprehensive treatment of the subject; how it by no means recognizes all the dynamic forces which have gone toward determining the course of English thought; how unscientific it is viewed from the standpoint of accuracy of statement and proof for assertions; how very vulnerable it is in many points. Few critics, however, will attempt to show how it ought to have been written, and perhaps no one will write a better one for a long time.

Certainly it should be regarded from the evolutionary point of view, and not as the last word to be said on the subject.

C. M. HILL.

Municipal Monopolies: A Collection of Papers by American Economists and Specialists. Edited by EDWARD W. BEMIS, Ph.D., Professor of Economic Science in the Kansas State Agricultural College. New York: T. Y. Crowell & Co., 1899. Pp. vi + 691. \$2.

THIS is one of the series of works published under the general editorship of Professor R. T. Ely, and known as the Library of Eco-